Exposition and critique of Julia Kristeva by White, Allon
1L'eclatement du sujet: the work of Julia Kristeva.
How could he say 'I' when he was something new and unknown, not 
himself at all? This I, this old formula of the age, was a dead 
letter.
- Women in Love
As Plato tells-us in-tha Cratylus (1), the Sophist (2) and in 
Letter VII O )  > there is no logos which does not presuppose the 
interlacing of names with verbs: syntax is the condition of coherence 
of rationality. Any disturbance of syntactic order or its elements 
destabilizes the relations of reason and calls into question the 
fixed boundaries of subject and object, cause and condition. It is 
on this account that the loss of syntactic coherence has been taken as 
an indication of insanity (A). The inability to fix pronouns in place 
and to keep their designation constant, the inability to follow the 
grammatical rules for negating, making a phrase passive or conditioned, 
or ordering the unities of subject and object in a sentence, these 
inabilities token the collapse of mental order and of symbolic control. 
For our purposes, they also token something more general which pertains 
even in cases when agrammaticality is not so drastic: any modifications 
in language, particularly infractions of syntactic laws, are a 
modification of the status of the subject (5)»
To invoke Plato at the outset is not-conventional piety: the 
philosophic rationalism which begins with Plato and which continues 
with uneven but massiye force, through-to the present day, has been a 
dominant and incisive model of what constitutes 'being human', 
anthropos as logos. It is the tradition which, present in Aquinas and 
centred in Bacon, Descartes, Locke and Kant, leads through to the 
philosophic concern of our century with the relation between language 
and logic. An acceptance of the notion that human understanding and 
the understanding of the human, must focus its analysis on the 
interlacing of names with verbs - on language as the bearer of logical 
relations and hence the articulation of the structure of mind - an 
acceptance of this notion is the grounding supposition of modern 
philosophy, particularly logical positivism and its offshoots, but also 
the phenomenology of Brentano.
The position ascribed to the subject in this tradition, though often 
left unspoken, is clearly that of a singular, transcendental unity. 
Its clearest expression is perhaps in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 
when Kant considers the unity of apperception:
To know anything in space (for instance, 
a line), I must draw it, and thus synthetically 
bring into being a determinate combination of 
the given manifold, so that the unity of this 
act is at the same time the unity of consciousness 
(as in the concept of a line); and it is through 
this unity of consciousness that an object (a 
determinate space) is first known. The synthetic
3afterlife, all laments and unjust misery, all laughter, lies, and 
intemperate desire for the pleasures of eating, drinking and sex. 
Madness and the representation of madness were also forbidden, and 
in music all the modes except two, which represent 'courage and 
moderation in good fortune or in bad', were likewise forbidden in the 
kingdom of philosophy. In other words, Plato feels his rational and 
unified Republic threatened from within by forces, desires and 
activities which must be censored or ostracized if the rational state 
is to be maintained. A closer look at the nature of these threatening 
forces reveals that what Plato has to exclude as dangerous are the 
desire for sensual pleasure, laughter, the representative of death and 
of madness, and those two art forms, music and literature, which may 
express or incite these subversive powers. V/hat are excluded then, are 
precisely those aspects of human activity which were to become the 
great themes of freudian psychoanalysis*.
The correspondence is not accidental. The schism which Plato 
introduced between a harmonious rationality on the one- hand, and 
disruptive forces of passion, wit, death and pleasure on the other 
hand, has marked every major western conception of the human.
Nietzsche, by borrowing the terms Apollonian and Dionysiac, puts the 
origin of the representation of the schism even further back than 
Plato, but it is Plato who first begins to theorize the disjunction 
between them by favouring a dominant rationalism at the expense of 
these other, potentially disruptive powers. The problem for any 
thinker who does not merely champion one of these sides in a simple 
minded way, is to attempt to think the relations between them, to 
comprehend (in both its senses) the rational and the irrational, the 
sentence and the song.
It is this massive project which Julia Kristeva attempts in La 
revolution du langage poetique (197*0. Her work is situated in the 
dialectic between formalist, passive, 'objective1 theories of 
language and mind on the one hand, ana active, psychoanalytical theories 
of subjectivity on the other, which together are attacked, synthesized 
and transposed to produce a new concept of subjectivity and its place 
in language and poetic literature. Poetry is the focus of the work 
because the space occupied by poetry is poised directly over the 
schism v/hich Plato opened up, the deep fissure between the thetic and 
those practices and impulses which threaten the thetic. Literature is 
the lieu privilsgie of analysis because it has revealed at certain 
times, in the practice of its writing, the destruction which is wrought 
upon the thetic by a number of extra-rational phenomena - the 
disposition of basic impulses, desires and fears v/hich can be seen only 
in the degre--. to which they alter the logical, propositional nature of 
normal communication.
This tension between the thetic and what for the moment I will term 
simply the non-thetic, is not an eternal war waged in a vacuum. It 
has determinate historical and social forms which arise from the 
particular ways in which the activity cf writers, caught up in the 
network of social meaning systems, transforms and challenges the 
tradition v/hich fails to contain that subjective activity. Literature, 
Kristeva argues (11), not only shows us how language works in disposing .
* Though it must be added that Freud's well known dislike of music 
led to it being under-represented in his theoretical writings.
2- unity-of- consciousnes.s„is, .therefore 
an objective condition of all knowledge..
It is not merely a condition that I
myself require in knowing an object,
but is a condition under which every
intuition must stand in order to become
an object for me. For otherwise, in
the absence of this synthesis, the manifold
would not be united in one consciousness, (6)
The identification of consciousness with a synthetic unity of mental 
action means that the ego constitutes itself as a whole, as "a self, 
which stabilizes the otherwise dispersed and contradictory 
perspectives of a being which has no fixed or unified position.
Modern linguistic philosophy (Frege, Carnap, Russell, Wittgenstein 
through to Quine and Strawson) explores this concatenation of syntax, 
logic and reference which unifies, and yet is made possible by, an 
homogeneous, singular subject, Wittgenstein's double assertion in the 
Tractatus - Die Grenzen meiner.Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner 
Welt: Die Logik erfullt die Welt; die Grenzen der Welt sind auch ihre 
Grenzen (7) - makes language, logic and the world co-terminous. The 
limits of my world, of what is for me, are made identical to the limits 
imposed by linguistic and rational order.
This rationalist project, with its attendant notion of the subject as 
a synthesizing upity, as the unique guarantee of being, is as dominant 
in modern linguistics as it is in philosophy. Nicely marked in 
Chomsky's Cartesian Linguistics (8) by the title of the book itself, 
Chomsky argues that the supporting subject of syntactic order is in 
.the Cartesian tradition of a unified cogito. Again, in post- 
Saussurian linguistics, Benveniste, writing on the pronominal 
opposition of Je/Vous, puts it thus:-
"Cette polarite ne signifie ni egalite 
ni symbtrie: l'.'ego" a toujours une 
position de transcendance a l'egard 
de tu". (9)
.Thus both the Chomskian and Caussurian conceptions of the subject in 
language accept the rationalist description of a transcendental ego, 
and thus both belong in this respect at least, to that philosophic 
tradition which goes back via Kant and Descartes to Plato. Kristeva 
calls this conception of the subject thetic,since it is characterized 
by the laying down or setting forth (-Gk. 'such as is placed') of 
•P°?fjkiye statements or propositions. The thetic conception considers 
subjectivity as a unified consciousness able to produce reason through 
the propositional structures embedded in syntactic order.
But for at least as long as it has existed, this thetic tradition of 
high rationalism has been mocked and haunted by alien spirits. From 
the outset, Plato had to exclude most of music and literature from the 
realms of The Republic (10), deleting from literature all horrifying 
and frightening names in the underworld, all gloomy accounts of the
o f the particular pattern of thetic against non-thetic in a text, it 
is also an activity which brings the laws of established discourse 
into question, and thereby present itself as a terrain where new sorts 
of discourse may be engendered,, And since, as I argued in my first 
paragraph, a change in discourse is a change in the status of the 
subject, a radical new poetic discourse may produce a radical new 
status for the subject,, But we must first recover much more of 
. Kristeva's argument before such a statement becomes clear.
Kristeva's first object of attack Is the thetic tradition of a single 
unified subject, embodied in philosophy, linguistics, and also in 
those types of literature centred on memetic and narrative 
representation (which not unnaturally turns out to be most of 
literature). Of course Kristeva's is only the last in a long line of 
such attacks, and substantially she is in agreement with both the 
sociological critique of the thetic (particularly as argued by Marx 
and Durkheim) and with the psychological critique (as argued by Freud, 
Lacan, and in some qualified respects, by Marcuse and Reich). In a 
way it would not be inaccurate to see Kristeva's project as a 
reworking of both the freudian and marxist notions of an active subject, 
as revealed in the modernist poetic activity, and mediated by a 
considerably revised version of modern linguistics.
The sociological critique of the thetic has become an intellectual 
reflex of our century. Meaning is not produced within a subject, but 
between subjects, in group-,- class and society. And meaning is not 
simply given, everywhere and always, in the singular bond between one 
mind and the world of objects: it is produced, it has a history in the 
forms of modes of its production, both in the socialization of the 
child and in the transformations of culture. The cognition go back at 
least to liamann's Vermischte Anmerkungen (12) (Miscellaneous 
Observations) of 1761, in which- the kinship of linguistic and economic 
systems of exchange is proposed as a way of explaining both.
Production, whether of objects or meanings is social, a mode of 
production, and Kristeva agrees'that it was necessary for Marx to 
emphasize this in iconoclastic opposition to the bourgeois?-ooncept of 
work as purely individual and personal. (13)° She quotes'Derrida with 
approval when he writes that (1*0 -
L'argent remplace les choses par leurs 
signes. Non seulement a l'interieur 
d'une societe mais d'une culture a 
1'autre, ou d'une organisation economique 
a 1'autre. C'est pourquoi 1'alphabet 
est commerjpant. II doit etre compris 
dans le moment monetaire de la rationalite 
economique. La description critique de 
1'argent est la reflexion fidele du discours 
sur l'ecriture.
For Marx, work could only be grasped in the values:- of use or 
exchange - into which it was crystallized. Work represents nothing 
outside of the values in which it is stored up, for it is only in 
these values that it can be measured and hence enter into society and
5S--..U><■*
into theory. Work takes on a determinate form, and thus takes on 
meaning, only when it has already entered the system of exchange as a 
particular amount of production. Labour itself, anterior to exchange, 
remains in Marx the foundation of his theory, but unthinkable except 
as an infinite potential of available physical and mental expenditure. 
But, Kristeva says, labour itself has become thinkable as a concept, 
even when it is anterior to exchange. For Kristeva, this pure activity 
of the human body is 'mute' - for it is logically antecedent to 
exchange and cannot therefore embody value - but must exist as the 
subject's praxis and expenditure which/^aken up by communication, by 
exchange, by determinate production, by meaning. Work cannot simply be 
a mode of production, but it must also be, simultaneously, subjective 
expenditure of effort, working itself through the mode of production. 
The two aspects have to be thought at once if the subject is not to be 
left as a blank, a passive, empty bearer of the social processes.
According to Kristeva, it is Freud's concept of work in the 
Traumarbeit which fills this blank and gives us the method to think 
through this 'production anterior to production', the disposition of 
subjective expenditure. Freud uncovers production itself as a 
process (15)) and as a particular semiotic system, a permutation of 
elements which models production and which is distinct from that of 
exchange. Kristeva thus wants to take account of Marxist, Logical- 
Philosophical and Freudian theories of the subject - the sociological, 
rationalist and psychological - but without collapsing the subject 
into any one of them. Her description of the subject thus draws on all 
three, but the central place is undoubtedly that of Freud.iansim recaste 
in the light of Lacan. She conceives this human subjectivity^as 
follows. (All page references to La Revolution du tangage Poetiquo 
are in brackets).
First of all (both in terms of the child and logically) to be human is 
to be a psycho-biological entity energized by the movements and 
rythms of impulses. The impulses are not only bio-energic charges but 
also psychic marks (p.23) and their disposition across the mind and 
body is called a chora space, room, place, locality).
The chora is a non-expressivo totality, constituted by the impulses 
and their stasis in a 'figured movement' which is gradually regulated 
by the constraints imposed upon the body by family and society. At 
this rudimentary stage it is hardly anything more than a certain rhythm, 
and its only analogy is body or vocalic movement. Kristeva follows 
Melanie Klein (16) in considering the oral and anal impulses the 
dominant ones, both structured and directed in relation to the body of 
the-mother (pp.26-27), in a pre-oedipal phase in which boys and girls 
alike view the mother as the receptacle of all that is desirable. The 
chora is the pre-socialized space of motility which makes gesture, 
phonic articulation and chromatic identification possible. Gradually, 
under the constraints of biological growth and family structure, this 
chora becomes limited and provisionally fixed (p„28) into the different 
semiotic materials - sound, movement, colour and shape - so that it 
takes on a sort of economy of functions in relation to its contexts.
This discharge of energy, which binds and orients the child to the mother, 
is always double, always both productive and destructive, (p.26) and in
6its doubleness may be likened to the double helix of the DNA molecule. 
The chora is thus the space of operation of sensory-motor impulses, 
both positive and negative in the degree to which they settle into a 
pattern but also destroy the stability of that pattern's nett"- 
movements (p.27). Because of this constant movement, there is no 
subject or personality at this stage, merely an unstable and 
provisional 'beating out' (frayage) of certain pathways and 
connections, the establishments of differences, parts of the body, the 
operation of vocal and anal sphincters, the focusing of the eyes and so 
forth.
All these processes constitute the basis for language, and form a 
crucial category in Kristeva's work, what she calls (perversely in 
view of its many other meanings) the semiotic. The semiotic is the 
production of sounds, rhythms, vocal and gestural modulations (such 
as intonation) but anterior to meaning, that is to say before lexical 
and syntactic organization:
Ce type de relations nous parait* ' .. 
susceptible de preciser le semiotique
en tant que modalite psychosomatique
du proces de la signifiance, c'est-a-dire
non symbolique mais articulant (au sens le
plus large du terme a'articulation) un
continuum...oTous ces processus et relations,
pre-signe et pre-syntaxe, viennent d'etre
places dans une optique genetique, comme
prealables et necessaires a 1'acquisition
du langage avec lequel ils ne se confondent
pas. (p.28).
The semiotic then is the pre-condition for communication and language 
proper. It is both the ability of the baby to produce movement and 
differences in voice and gesture, and, more importantly, the rhythmic 
and phonic modulations which, though chronologically earlier than 
speech, always accompany speech as its material and psycho-physical 
grounding throughout adult life. Sven in the highest flights of 
rational thought, this semiotic basis is the necessary accompaniment 
and continue. But in dreams and in certain modern literary texts, it 
actually becomes dominant and breaks through the thetic part of 
language:-
Ce n'est pourtant que par la logique 
du rove qu'ils ont pu attirer 1'attention, 
et ce n'est que dans certaines pratiques 
signifiantes, comme celle du texte, qu'ils 
dominant le proces de la signifiance. (p.28)
Any innate, genetic traits find their place here-, in the semiotic, 
the ordering and disposing of primary processes such as displacement 
and condensation, absorption and repression, rejection and stasis, all 
the processes which are the innate pre-conditions in the species for 
the acquisition of language (p.29)« In a sense, this semiotic order 
is pure musicality. It is rhythm, tonal difference, phonic change,
7movement of the body and of the limbs. This semiotic area, 
characterized as enigmatic, indifferent to language, feminine, a 
semiotic rhythm, is a sort of orchestration of primary movements and 
functions, what Nallarme called a "Mystere dans les lettresP' (p.29). 
Since it is anterior to signs and syntax - interior to conabious 
communication - it is, quite literally,' the unconscious, and it is at 
this point that the link with Freud becomes visible:-
Notre position du semiotique est, on le 
voit, inseparable d'une theorie du sujet 
qui tient compte de la position freudienne 
de l'inconscient. Decentrant l'ego transcendental, 
le coupant et 1'ouvrant a unedialectique dans 
laquelle son entendement syntaxique et categoriel 
n'est que le moment liminaire du proces, lui-meme 
toujours agi par le rapport a 1’autre que domine 
la pulsion de mort et sa reiteration productrice 
de "signifiant".*tel nous apparait ce sujet dans 
le langage. (p.30)
The reference to the death instinct (la pulsion de mort) is central in 
Kristeva* s thinking on the nature of the chora and its semiotic 
expression (even though it must be counted as the most controversial 
and least suj^ported of Freudian concex>ts (17) ). The chora is described 
as the place of articulation of the death instinct across primary 
narcissism and the desire for pleasure of the subject, this 
transversality disrupting his identity so that new psychic patterns are 
beaten out. The death instinct is the tendency of the organism to 
return to a homeostatic state, rest and equilibrium, whilst the desire 
for pleasure drives against this stasis* But Kristeva gives a priority 
to the importance of the death instinct by saying that (footnote to p.27) 
pleasure and narcissism are simply provisional positions against which 
the death instinct pushes, the resulting pressures creating new mental 
passages. Narcissism and pleasure are thus the 'inveigling and 
realization of the death instinct'.
Kristeva also links the Freudian idea of a death instinct with a more 
philosophical conception v/hich she shares with Jacques Derrida (18). 
Death is nothing other than a destruction of identity (in both the 
hegelian and everyday meaning of the word) and is thus negation and 
difference with relation to a given subject. Kristeva thus writes 
about 'la pulsion de mort' as negativity or rejection, any force which 
tends to destroy the constituted identity of the subject, even though 
this may have only a metaphorical relation to 'death' in the commonly 
conceived notion of the word.
The chora then is the 'space of motility' which engenders the semiotic, 
the grounding of signification in vocalic and corporal movement before 
it can make signs and sentences. Its nearest representations sire the 
babble of the child and the rhythms of music.
8This semiotic layer does not disappear when the child learns to speak, 
but on the contrary remains as the necessary basis of articulation and 
sense, it is what drives language on and makes it possible. Language 
can never be simply a passive set of protocols and structures - though 
this is usually the way it is envisaged by modern linguistics - but it 
must be a praxis, an activity and process v/hich is motivated by the 
psychobiological disposition of the speaking subject,,
The next question to which Kristeva addresses herself is how, on the 
basis of this semiotic chora, the thetic (logical, judging, naming) part 
of subjectivity may be produced. Kristeva subsumes all the logical, 
predicative, syntaxic aspects of language under one term which, again 
demonstrating a wilful perversity in the face of accepted usage she terms 
.the symbolic. The symbolic is an extension of the thetic discussed 
above, it is that major part of language which names and relates things, 
it is that unity of semantic and syntactic competence which allows 
communication and rationality to appear, Kristeva has thus divided 
language into two vast realms, the semiotic - sound, rhythm and movement 
anterior to sense and linked closely to the impulses (Triebe) - and the 
symbolic - the semantico-syntactic function of language necessary to 
all rational communication about the world. The latter, the symbolic, 
usually 'takes charge of' the semiotic and binds it into syntax and 
phonemes, but it can only do so on the basis of the sounds and movements 
presented to it by the semiotic. The dialectic of the two parts of 
language form the mise en scene of Kristeva's description of poetics, 
subjectivity, and revolution.
To even ask the question 'how is the symbolic produced?', one has 
already delivered a direct challenge to much rationalist-based philosophy. 
Instead of accepting the thetic notion of subjectivity as a given, 
defining what may be judged as subjectivity by remaining exclusively in 
the realm of predication, and analysing its structure, Kristeva displaces 
it from its accepted centrality, to show that it is a produced stage in 
the development of subjectivity, bound to, and articulated upon, another 
stage which makes it possible, and which is neither the realm of objects 
nor the directly social, but also a part of subjectivity. The 
transcendental ego of Kant and modern logic suddenly finds that it is 
not alone, nor sovereign, as it had always thought. But this is 
emphatically not to say that the notion of a transcendental ego may now 
be jettisoned in favour of an heterogeneous concept of mind. What was 
wrong was not the argument that a unified subject was necessary to the 
unity of apperception and hence to the logic of predication: such an 
argument must necessarily hold true. But- art" is wrong to make this 
transcendental ego co-extensive with subjectivity as such, rather than a 
produced stage within it. Kristeva does not seek to destroy the 
philosophic concept of the thetic, nor the weight of logical and 
linguistic philosophy based upon it, but she seeks to decentre the 
concept by accommodating it within a subjectivity'which has an unconscious, 
psychobiological drives, and a history:-
'La philosophie moderne est d'accord pour 
reconnaatre que c'est a 1'ego transcendental 
que revient le droit de representer la th$se 
instauratrice de la signification (signe 
et/ou proposition). Mais c'est seulement a 
partir de Freud que la question peut £tre
9posee non pas sur l'origine de cette 
these, mais sur le proces de sa production.
A stigmatiser dans le th£tique le fondement 
de la m£taphysiquef on s'expose a ctre son 
anti-chambre; a moins de specifier les 
conditions de production de cette these. La 
theorie freudienne de 1'inconscient et son 
developpement lacanien nous paraissent, etre 
precisement une mise a jour du fait que la 
signification thetique est un stade productible 
dans certaines conditions precises lors du 
proces de la signifi^ance, qu'elle constitue le 
sujet sans se reduire a son proces, puisqu'elle 
est le seuil du langage.' (p.43)
Kristeva distinguishes therefore between tile semiotic (the impulses and 
their articulation, p.A-1) and the domaine of signification, the symbolic, 
which is always a domaine of propositions or judgements, that is to say, 
a domaine of positions. This positionality, the ability to take up a 
point of view, (explored by Husserl in his phenomenological reduction) 
is what installs the identity of the subject and of his objects, 
identity being a separation which the subject achieves between the image 
of himself and the image of the world. He becomes conscious of himself 
as a self, and of the world as a world of objects and of other subjects 
separate from himself. This coming-to-consciousness is actually an 
identifiable period in the growth of the child, and is signalled by his 
ability to produce holophrastic utterances, which are probably not 
always fully formed sentences (NP-VP) as conceived by generative grammar, 
but differ from the babble of an earlier phase in that they separate out 
a subject from an object and attribute to it some fragment of meaning 
(as for example, when the cat goes "miaow" and all animals are then 
designated "miaows").
The mechanisms which produce this symbolic, and hence thetic level of 
identity and signification, are the mirror phase (19) and the castration 
complex.
It is the mirror phase which produces the child’s "spatial intuition" 
which is at the heart of signification (and which accounts for the fact 
that the spatial metaphor is the dominant organizing metaphor in language). 
The mirror phase, taken from Lacan, designates, in a way that is partly 
literal and partly metaphorical, the point in a child's development when 
fascinated by its own image in a mirror, it recognizes the reversed 
image of a self. This visual, image of himself is the first time that 
the child._conceives of himself in his imagination as a totality 
separated from the rest of the world. It is the necessary precondition 
for the child to be able to say "me" or "I", as well as being the visual 
image which stands as the prototype for the world of objects.(20). The 
mirror phase inaugurates the position-separation-identification which 
permits the formation of sentences and propositions.
The mirror phase may be decomposed into three separate moments. At 
first, the child perceives the image in the mirror as a real being whom 
he tries to grasp or approach. He reacts to this image by jubilatory
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mimicry, and what is indicated at this stage is the recognition of the 
body-image of another as a whole. Lacan writes:-
C'est que la forme totale du corps par 
quoi le sujet devance dans un mirage la 
maturation de sa puissance, ne lui est 
donnee que comme Gestalt, c'est-a-dire 
dans une exteriorite, ou certes cette 
forme est-elle plus constituante que 
constitute, mais ou surtout elle lui 
apparaat dans un relief de stature qui 
la fige et sous une symetrie qui 1'inverse, 
en opposition a la turbulence de mouvement 
dont il s'eprouve l'animer.
u)
At first the gestalt offers an image of the body which is quite opposed 
to the ’turbulent movement' which the child himself feels. But before 
very long the child discovers that the image is nothing but an image.
He no longer seeks to seize it, nOr does he search for the other behind 
the mirror, because he realizes that there is no- - body. Thirdly, thc- 
child recognizes, not simply an image but his image in the specular 
reflection of himself. In this moment of recognition he has to a degree 
which is close to being literal, realized an image of himself, he has 
grasped his own appearance, the image that he makes for/of himself, as 
a produced identity, a conquest of his body as a unity and as an image. 
It is this identification and unification of a self as a self's image, 
which is important for the generation of a unified consciousness capable 
of producing speech. Anthony Wilden writes:-
The central concept of the mirror phase 
is clear: this primordial experience is 
symptomatic of what makes the moi an 
imaginary construct. The ego is an Idealich, 
another self, and the stade du miroir is the 
source of all later identifications. (22)
The total image of the body, set over against a realm of otherness, is 
thus the moment of production and structuration of an identity through 
the mediation of the body-image. The transcendental ego necessary to 
logical and rational communication and action comes into play during the 
mirror phase. Confirmation of this comes from another source, and lends 
considerable support to Lacan's theory.
The image of the body in bits and pieces, le corps morcelb, is one of 
the most common of dreams, fantasies, certain types of schizophrenia, 
experience of drugs, art and literature. The works of Hieronymus Bosch, 
Salvador Dali and Artaud express the notion clearly. This corporal 
disintegration is the reverse of the constitution of the body during the 
mirror phase, and it occurs only at those times when the unified and 
transcendent ego is threatened with dissolution. The way in which the 
fantasy of the fragmented body accompanies the breakdown of rational 
sovereignty is the clear complement of Lacan's idea that the image of 
the total body is necessary to the creation of rational unity. In each
case, the image of the body, of the self, mediates thetic unity and 
disintegration.
For Kristeva, the fear ox castration finished off (paracheve) this 
process (p.M+). The argument becomes a little murky at this point 
(p.^5-50) but as I read it, the cas’tration complex has tv/o effects which 
further the installation of the symbolic. Firstly, the mother, hitherto 
the receptacle and receiver of every demand from the child, is separated 
from the child (by (a) the gradual cessation of weaning and (b) the 
gradual intervention of the father) which has the effect of detaching 
the child from its dependence and identity with the mother, thus opening 
up a lack, an absence of that-which-is-desired which can only be 
represented by a figurative substitute, an image or representation. 
Speech arises as an attempt to fill this lack, this 'oeance towards the 
absent object (in this case the mother). At the epistemological level, 
the "lack of an object" is the gap in the signifying chain which the 
subject seeks to fill at the level of the signifier.
Secondly, the separation from the mother nov/ makes her into an ’other', 
someone for whom, and to whom, the speech is made and addressed. The 
speech is made for her and not for me, and it is thus that the other is 
established as possessor of, or space _of, the signifier:-
La b§ance entre l'ego image et la motilite 
pulsionnelle, entre la mere et la demande 
qui lui est adressee, est la coupure'mome 
qui instaure ce que Lacan appelle le lieu 
de 1'Autre comme lieu du "signifiant". Le 
sujet est occults "par un signifiant toujours 
plus pur", rnais ce manque a y etre confere a 
un autre le r-Sle de tenir la possibilite de 
la signification. (23)
This moment of separation from the mother is a part of the castration 
complex because Rristeva, following Lacan, makes the mother an 
identification with the phallus ('c'cst dire qu'elle est le phallus' 
p.^5). The child is "cut off" from the immediate nurturing contact with 
the mother hitherto enjoyed with such close physical and mental bonding 
that there was neither need nor space for the establishment of 
communication about things. At the same time this period is when the 
sexuality of the child ceases to be "polymorphous perverse" (the child 
as demanding sexual contact and pleasure for all parts of the body and 
irrespective of incest laws) and becomes specifically genital, the laws 
of incest., (The Laws) always linguistically structured, are imposed at 
the same time (p.^5). It is this reference to incest phohibition which 
completes the oedipal triangle and completes the castration complex. The 
installation of symbolic language (thetic, naming, propositional) is what 
allows the imposition of The Law, the interdiction of the Mother as a 
focus of love through the 'apprehension' (as both fear and learning) of 
the Paternal order. Lacan writes in his Rome Discourse
'The primordial Law is therefore that which 
in regulating marriage ties superimposes the 
kingdom of culture on that of nature abandoned
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to the law of copulation,, The 
interdiction of incest is only 
its subjective pivot, revealed 
by the modern tendency to reduce 
to the mother and the sister the 
objects forbidden to the subject's 
choice, although full licence outside 
of there is not yet entirely open.
This law, therefore is revealed clearly 
enough as identical to an order of 
language. For without kinship nominations, 
no power is capable of instituting the 
order of preferences and taboos which 
bind and weave the yarn of lineage down 
through succeeding generations,,,,,.It 
is in the name of the father that we 
must recognize the support of the 
symbolic function which, from the dawn 
of history has identified his person with 
the figure of the law', (2^)
The mirror phase and the castration complex thus set up the second layer 
of language, the symbolic, which is language as communication proper, 
which names objects aid expresses their relation to one another in the 
laws of syntax. The symbolic is thus generated by the birth of desire 
as it replaces the simple demand of the child and by the birth of 
repression (The Primary Repression of the Oedipal interdiction which 
prefigures all later repressions) as it replaces simple rejection. The 
two levels of signification therefore, the semiotic and the symbolic, 
"correspond" as forms of meaning, to the maternal and paternal functions 
in the oedipal relation which the child lives through as a condition of 
his growth. And just as an adult's sexual behaviour is rooted in his own 
particular experience of the oedipal, his own produced configuration of 
identification and rejection of the figures of father and mother, so too 
the adult's particular subjectivity will be rooted in the specific 
intermixing of the semiotic and the symbolic, the rejection and 
acceptance of law incessantly weaving the particular dialectic of his 
personality. Active and passive, submission and aggression, rationality 
and passion spin out a pattern of loose and now tighter threads which, 
in their recurrence and repetitions, are the pattern of subjectivity. In 
other words, it is the way in whica the semiotic relates to and dis­
figures the symbolic, as well as the way in which the symbolic reasserts 
its unifying control of the semiotic, which gives us the basis of 
subjectivity as a process. From the mirror phase onwards the semiotic 
and the symbolic involve each other in a shifting process of dependence 
and rejection, the spreading reticulatiom of syrfactic and nominal order 
are informed and sometimes broken, by the power of the semiotic; the 
signifying power of desire, aggression and pleasure are disposed 
according to the way ..the particular person has lived through the oedipal 
complex and that experience is compulsively repeated in all his later 
psychic processes.
Kristeva thus reverses the normal way of thinking about the thetic 
consciousness. It is not some already constituted "I" which produces 
coherent sentences about the world: on the contrary, it is the
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introduction of the child into the world ox syntax which permits the 
development of that child as a unified subject, as a conscious "I".
The thetic and the syntactic are inseparable and the production of 
subject and predicate, name and verb, or to take up the terms of 
Strawson, 'feature concepts' and 'feature-placing statements', the 
production of the two major syntactic unities (the placed and the 
placing, the bound and the binding, the modified and the modifier are 
three ways in which these nominal and predicative functions have been 
described) enables the subject to achieve a stable position over against 
the world. The most significant result of this reversal is that it is 
only in language that the "I" exists, but this "I" is not exhaustive of 
the subject who is producing the language. There is always a difference 
between the subject as expressed in a sentence and the subject who 
produces the sentence, the former being a temporary position adopted 
within the process of the latter.
This distinction, drav/ing as it does on the familiar linguistic 
difference between the subject who speaks (le sujet de 1'enonciation) 
and the subject of what is said (le sujet de l'enonce) is an elegant 
solution to the dichotomy posed at the outset. These two different 
subjects correspond to the active, heterogenous subject and the unified, 
thetic subject respectively, and together make up the process of self- 
produccion of subjectivity:-
Productrice du sujet parlant, cette 
alteration se realise a condition de 
laisser hors d'elle, dans 1'heterogene, 
ce meme sujet parlant. (p.55)
And again, further on in her exposition, Kristeva writes that
Le sujet n'est jamais, le sujet n'est 
que le proces de. la signifiance et ne 
se presente que comme pratique signifiante 
c'est-a-dire lorsqu 'il s'absente dans la
-- ----  • position a partir tie laquelle se deploie
l'activite sociale-historique-signifiante. (p.ltS)
If I write "I sing the sofa", the "I" of that sentence is not the same 
as the "I" who produced the sentence even though it attempts to be so.
It is logically impossible that the "I" who sing the sofa may be 
coincident with and exhaustive of, the supposedly same- "I" that writes 
' "I" sing the sofa'. It must be some other self who is grasping the 
self as an object to write about, and Kristeva endorses and extends this 
familiar philosophical paradox by theorizing the mode of production of 
the first "I" (the subject of what is said) by the second "I" (the 
subject who speaks)'. The history of subjectivity is never the history of 
a subject always present to himself, but on the contrary, history of a 
process of capture and escape, stability and dissolution, an heterogeneous 
subject which is perpetually displacing its own established positions.
The-subject which supports syntax and makes it possible is necessarily 
absent from it, but when it does re-emerge it tends to perturb thetic 
calm by redistributing the signifying order, by altering syntax and by 
disrupting nominal groups. This is not to say that the sentence structure 
is destroyed, but it is pushed into an infinite variety of new forms,
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forms which Mallarme, Lautreamont and James Joyce were the first to 
produce and enjoy. These revolutionary textual forms effected a 
revolutionary conception of subjectivity which, according to Kristeva 
(p.592) embodies a degree of freedom which will require "at the best 
several centuries" to be fully realized in practical social terms:-
Que dans l'art en general, et dans 
le texte plus particulierement a partir 
de la fin du XIX° siecle, se constitue un 
langage qui parle ces lieux de rupture que 
la conscience de classe economists refcrule, 
lieux de.rupture propres au desir des masses
___ _ mais inexprimes et peut-£tre meme inexprimables
par elles dans la societe capitaliste productiviste 
en etat d'industrialisation, lieux de rupture done 
retires dans 1'experiences des elites culturelles 
et, au sein de ces elites accessibles a de rares 
sujets chez qui ces ruptures courent le risque 
et l'avantage de se radicaliser jusqu'a la folie 
ou 1'esthetisme et de perdre ainsi leurs attaches 
avec la cha$ne sociale, - voila ce que nous voudrions 
suggerer". (25)
This claim evidently needs close scrutiny.
The relation of the semiotic to the symbolic is neither facile opposition 
nor simple dependence, and Kristeva never champions the one at the 
expense of the other. Though it is the energy, sound rhythm and 
movement of the semiotic which grounds the word-foundation of the 
symbolic, the latter is nevertheless the condition of heterogeneity 
which continues to assure the' stable position of the subject and, in 
deploying his semiotic 'musicality', assures the continuance of the 
subject as a source of meanings (ppo62-S3). The thetic is the threshold 
between the semiotic and the symbolic, and the essential point of 
Kristeva's theoretical position- in La Revolution du Langage Poetique 
resides in this: that the modes of infusion between semiotic and 
symbolic across the thetic give us the forms of subjectivity, and 
whatever modes these may be, they become particularized and harden out 
into specific patterns of individuality through the psychic processes 
discovered by Freud and reformulated by Lacan. The relation to one's 
mother and father in the realm of the imaginary, fetishism, anal 
obsession, identification with the law (hysteria p.329) and rejection of 
all law (psychosis p.329) these are all modes through which the thetic 
may be transgressed to give a distinctive and recognisable type of 
subjectivity. The mode of transgression, or what Kristeva calls 
'forclusion' following Lacan's translation of Verwerfung (rejection), is 
what distinguishes Mallarme from Lautreamont and determines a particular 
type of subjectivity. The manifold processes whereby the semiotic may 
break through the symbolic, or whereby the .symbolic assumes control of 
the semiotic, is transfixed by the forms of movement and displacement 
which take place across them both.
The role of poetic modernism in this process of subjective creation is 
paramount, since it is the practlce of those inner unconscious 
movements of which psychoanalysis is the theory:-
15
'Alors, dans cet ordre sccio-symbolique 
ainsi sature sinon deja clos, la poesie - 
disons plus exactement le langage poetique - 
rappelle ce qui fut depuis toujours sa 
fonction: introduire, a travers le symbolique, 
ce qui le travel lie, le traverse et le menace.
Ce que la theorie de 1'inconscient cherche, 
le langage poetique le pratique a l'interieur 
et a 1'encontre de 1'ordre social: moyen ultime 
de sa mutation ou de sa subversion, condition de 
sa survie et de sa revolution'. (p.79)
'Literature' in the writing of Lautreamont, Mallarme, Artaud Roussel and 
Joyce, has been the refusal to conceal or repress the signifier, the 
material operation of language, itself, even though it is the signifier 
which founds culture and signification. The 'burst unity' (L'unite eclatee) 
of Chants de haldoror and the Poesies of Lautreamont confront (or rather 
'affront') the world of discourse in its constitutive lav/s, subverting its 
'normal' and 'established' order, and by disrupting it, opening out a 
revolutionary possibility for subjectivity within the new significatory 
processes. Not surprisingly however, Kristeva remains uncertain about the 
exact nature of the relation between the disruption of normal fictional and 
poetic practice on the one hand and tne political, revolutionary disruption 
of social relations on the other. In its strong form, Kristeva claims ar. 
active, determining correspondence between the two, the pleasure and violence 
which breaks the repressive laws of pnallocentric logic at the level of the 
subject, actively promote revolutionary social change by 'overthrowing' the 
ensemblist logic which underpinned the existing society:-
'...« il y a des textes qui, en introduisant 
1'infinite du proces dans les elements 
constitutifs du system linguistique et dans 
les enonces finis du code social (c'est-a-dire 
dans les id&olog&mes qui expriment les rapports 
de production' et de reproduction socialement 
cod§s) operent aux limites ou. la logique ensemblistc 
du systerae social est mise en peril ... En ce sens, 
et tout en restant enferraes dans la maison etatique 
les "poetes" pour etre des "souverains rnineurs" ou 
des "enfants de la maison" n'y ajoutent pas moins 
un rSle subversif radical qu'aucune autre pratique 
ne peut assumer'. (p.33l)
At other points, Kristeva's description of the role supposedly played by- 
poetry in the transformation of bourgeois ideology is cast differently. She 
even puts an opposite argument to the one just given and writes that, by an 
irony of assimilation with which we are all familiar, the avent-garae of the 
late 19th Century served the needs of the dominant ideology by acting as a 
substitute for the repressed subjective praxis that the society itself, 
denied:-
'En abdiquant ainsi le processus social en cours, 
et tout en exhibant un moment refoule mais 
constituant pour autant qu'il exhibe le moment
16
dissolvant toute unite constitute, le 
texte avant-gardiste du XIXe siecle sert 
1' ideologie dominante puisqu'il lui 
fournit de quoi substituer a ses manques, 
sans mettre directeraent en cause, le systeme 
de sa reproduction dans la representation 
(dans la signification)' (p=l86)
In another formulation, Lautreamont played a role of passive witness 
('temoin') to changes in the subject which 'correspond' (and it is the 
nature of this correspondence which is precisely in question here) to the 
social 'eclatement' of the 1871 revolution:-
Ainsi, sans denier 1'unite de la raison (du 
symbolique et du sujet qu'il pose), mais en 
1'excentrant, en affirmant le sujet comme une 
contradiction, Lautreamont-Ducasse donne a ses 
textes une connotation heroique, revolutionnaire, 
qui temoigne pour le sujet de ce que vont essayer 
a l'echelle sociale les masses revoltees de Paris 
en 1871. (p.*f8l).
Of the many i^roblems which Kristeva's work raises, the relation between th< 
formal literary 'revolution' of Mallarme and Lautreamont and social 
revolutionary practice seems to me by far the most questionable* For 
Kristeva, the tv/o writers are fundamentally important because they mount 
attacks, from opposed but complementary directions, on phallocentric logic: 
Mallarme, by identification with the mother (and through the form of his 
verse with the 'maternal', infinite genotext of the semiotic); Lautreamont, 
by his violent, implacable attack on the father figure, law, and all forms 
phallocentric domination* Mallarme subverts, ruptures and finally destroys 
the- laws of syntax which are the guarantee of the laws of reason, the laws 
of the father and the laws of the state* Lautreamont, by permuting the 
shifters of the narrative in Chants de iialdoror, breaks up the unity of the 
subject found in traditional narrative forms with their sustained and clear 
distinguished actants (the 'coherent' character of folk-take and realist 
novel)* Thus Lautreamont too, disperses, from a complementary perspective, 
the unified, transcendent subject which.had hitherto always underpinned 
phallocentric rationality*
However, the step which Kristeva makes from this achieved poetic destructio 
of masculine rationality to political practice and feminism, seems to me a 
deft sleight of pen, a merely sophistical linkage. The space between the 
formal textual innovations which she describes and the radical political 
practice (feminism) to which she subscribes, is never satisfactorily filled 
since the destruction of syntactic order and prominal stability in a poetic 
discourse, even when it can be appropriated for political use is always and 
only, a negative politics, an evanescent disruption, incapable of 
identifying its own political agent (masculine or feminine).
In other words, the destruction of actantial position and pro-position in 
this poetic revolution can never have a positive vector, a political direct: 
(direction is a function of stable identity), it always remains purified
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anarchisra in a perpetual state of self-dispersal. And in this respect, it 
reveals its close material relation to the french left-academic context of 
its own production. Thus the form of La Revolution du Langage Po^tique, a 
massive work within the philosophic tradition of the doctorat d'gtat, is 
evidently in contradictionjwith the content, a content manifestly hostile 
to the laws of the discourse in which the argument is caste. This argument 
is an appeal for an anarchist aesthetics, to displace the traditional 
sociology of literature across Lacanian' psychoanalysis and recognizing in 
that process the formal novelties of the twentieth century-avant-garde as a 
crucial shift in our understanding of subjectivity. Upon this theoretical 
basis, the object of politics in general arid feminism in particular, is to
follow the lead of this artistic avant-garde and achieve politically the
destruction of the. old, traditionally unified subject.
Kristeva has recently stated this link betv/een tiieory and feminist praxis 
very clearly in an interview which she gave to L'Espresso, the Italian 
communist journal, in April, 1977:-
"Io credo che il probleraa de movimento 
femminile £ oggi quello dr 'diventare 
una forma dell ’ anarchi-smo che ritraduce 
in comportamenti e azione il dlfecorsro
dell1 avanguardia storica: l'a distruzione
del soggetto occidentale.
(I believe that the problem of the feminist 
movement today is that of inventing a form 
•" of anarchism which will express in behaviour 
and in action the discourse of the historical 
avant-garde: the destruction of the (traditional) 
western subject).
L 1Espresso, April 1977i p.63.
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In this interview Celine and Pound are given as examples of what is here 
meant by the. ’historical avant-garde’, both, in their own way, having burst 
open.the settled, unified subject underpinning ’masculine’ bourgeois’ thought. 
Despite their ostensible fascism, Celine and Pound, v/ere for Kristeva, 
substantially anti-fascist in their formal comprehension of its (psychologic^ 
origins (’I discorsi delle avanguardia artistiche sono stati i soli veri" 
discorsi anti-fascisti con conoscenza (inconscia) di causa’). Feminism, 
according to Kristeva, thus has its political future mapped out along a 
route which leads back to The Cantos, a journey ’au bout de la nuit’„ It 
is for feminists to discuss this project for themselves., and its anarchist 
grounding-aft' the theoretical work outlined above. For myself, Kristeva’.s 
project is a brilliant essay in psycho-anarchic aesthetics, but which replace 
a repressive, phallocentric logos by something far worse, a ’new’ subject, 
drifting, dispersed, and.as politically impotent as it is ever possible to 
be. An agent without agency, direction or cohesion, neither an-sich or 
fur sich, even more vulnerable to the force of social history than Ezra 
Pound, tearful, in his ward at St.Elizabeth's asylum.
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